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Ronald A. Fein* 
It’s been just over five years since the Supreme Court’s 
widely-criticized decision in Citizens United v. FEC, which swept 
away a federal ban on corporate expenditures in federal election 
campaigns.1 The decision provoked widespread criticism for the 
Court’s rejection of a constitutional distinction between 
corporations and natural persons, and its pronouncement that 
independent political expenditures, even from corporations, 
cannot “corrupt” the political process.2 
The public is remarkably united in its disagreement with both 
premises. Multiple polls show that an overwhelming majority of 
Americans—about 80% of both Democrats and Republicans—
oppose the Citizens United ruling and support limits on corporate 
and union political spending, as well as campaign fundraising and 
spending in general.3 And as of this writing, sixteen states—as well 
 
 * Legal Director, Free Speech For People; J.D., Stanford Law School, 2003. The 
author thanks the other participants at the November 7, 2014 symposium on “Advancing 
a New Jurisprudence for American Self-Government and Democracy,” co-sponsored by 
Harvard Law School (through academic host Professor John Coates) and Free Speech For 
People: Mark Alexander, John Bonifaz, Ben Clements, John Coates, Caroline Mala 
Corbin, Kent Greenfield, Deborah Hellman, Rob Jackson, Tom Joo, Lawrence Lessig, 
Tamara Piety, Jed Purdy, U.S. Senator Jon Tester, Jennifer Taub, Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, 
Larry Tribe, and Federal Election Commissioner Ellen Weintraub. For more information 
on Free Speech For People, a public interest advocacy organization formed on the day of 
the Citizens United decision, see http://www.freespeechforpeople.org. Four of the 
symposium participants who contributed to this issue serve on Free Speech For People’s 
unpaid Legal Advisory Committee: John Coates, Tom Joo, Tamara Piety, and Jennifer 
Taub. 
 1. 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010). 
 2. See id. at 357, 364. 
 3. See Nicholas Confessore & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Shows Americans Favor 
an Overhaul of Campaign Financing, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2015, at A18; Lydia Saad, Half 
in U.S. Support Publicly Financed Federal Campaigns, GALLUP (June 24, 2013), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/163208/half-support-publicly-financed-federal-campaigns.asp
x; Mark Sherman, AP-NCC Poll: Public Wants to Limit Influence on Elections by Cash-
Rich Outside Interest Groups, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 15, 2012), http://ap-
gfkpoll.com/uncategorized/our-latest-poll-findings-10; Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority 
Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on Campaign Financing, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2010 
4:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021
701151.html. 
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as 665 cities and towns across thirty-eight states—have passed 
resolutions calling for an amendment to overturn Citizens United.4 
In the words of Judge Calabresi, the democratic value of political 
equality “is so fundamental that sooner or later it is going to be 
recognized. Whether this will happen through a constitutional 
amendment or through changes in Supreme Court doctrine, I do 
not know. But it will happen.”5 Since Citizens United, decisions in 
areas ranging from campaign finance6 to corporate religious 
exemptions7 have enhanced the urgency of developing new ways 
of thinking about the role of money in politics, the role of 
corporations under the First Amendment, how corporate law 
should respond to Citizens United and its progeny, and, most 
importantly, strategies for moving forward. 
This symposium issue features nine articles developed from 
discussions among an extraordinary assembly of scholars, public 
interest lawyers, and public officials at a one-day symposium on 
November 7, 2014 at Harvard Law School. The articles in this 
issue reflect fresh insights, from both constitutional and corporate 
law, on how best to understand the intersection of money, politics, 
corporations, and the Constitution. But first, some background. 
I. CITIZENS UNITED AND ITS AFTERMATH 
Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, sought to distribute 
a video-on-demand documentary criticizing Hillary Clinton 
shortly before a 2008 Democratic primary election.8 This plan 
appeared to run afoul of a provision of the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 prohibiting corporations (and unions) from 
using general treasury funds to make independent expenditures 
for “electioneering communication[s].”9 
Citizens United sued the Federal Election Commission, 
basing its primary argument on statutory interpretation. It argued 
that a video-on-demand program, which customers would have to 
affirmatively select and pay for, did not meet the statutory 
 
 4. See State and Local Support, UNITED FOR THE PEOPLE, 
http://united4thepeople.org/state-and-local-support/ (last visited June 11, 2015). 
 5. Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 201 (2d Cir. 2011) (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
 6. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441–42 (2014) (limiting allowable 
government interest in regulating political contributions to “quid pro quo corruption” and 
invalidating aggregate contribution limits). 
 7. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774–75 (2014) 
(interpreting Religious Freedom Restoration Act to cover business corporations). 
 8. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319–20 (2010). 
 9. See id. at 318–19, 321; 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2014) (transferred from 2 U.S.C. § 441b). 
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definition of “electioneering communication.”10 But Citizens 
United also raised a First Amendment challenge. By the time 
Citizens United got to the Supreme Court, its argument was 
constitutional but narrow. The appeal presented the key question 
as “[w]hether the prohibition on corporate electioneering 
communications in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(‘BCRA’) can constitutionally be applied to a feature-length 
documentary film about a political candidate funded almost 
exclusively through noncorporate donations and made available 
to digital cable subscribers through Video On Demand.”11 But the 
Court’s ultimate decision swept far more broadly, with a number 
of remarkable conclusions. 
The Court, in a 5-4 opinion by Justice Kennedy, declared that 
“independent expenditures, including those made by 
corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of 
corruption,” and that “[t]he appearance of influence or access . . . 
will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”12 It 
rejected any constitutional basis for regulating corporations’ 
political expenditures differently from those of natural persons, 
describing corporations as Tocquevillian “associations of 
citizens” and implying that a law that “exempts some corporations 
but covers others” invidiously discriminates against “certain 
disfavored associations of citizens—those that have taken on the 
corporate form.”13 And as to whether the “citizens” constituting 
these “associations” actually support management’s decisions on 
political spending, the Court declared that there was “little 
evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders 
‘through the procedures of corporate democracy.’”14 
Citizens United thus brought together two areas of law: 
campaign finance and the extension of constitutional rights to 
corporations. In campaign finance, Citizens United reversed 
decades of precedent allowing limits on corporate (and union) 
political spending.15 But its seeds had been planted in Buckley v. 
Valeo, which treated campaign money as protected “speech” in 
 
 10. Id. at 322. 
 11. Brief for Appellant at i, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-
205), available at http://goo.gl/zOzLqu. 
 12. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357, 360. 
 13. Id. at 349, 352, 356. 
 14. Id. at 361–62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 
(1978)). 
 15. See id. at 365 (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 
(1990) and McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)). 
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the first place.16 As for corporate constitutional rights, Citizens 
United represents the culmination of a trend, which began in the 
1880s17 but was mostly dormant until the 1970s,18 of extending to 
corporate entities many of the rights guaranteed to individuals in 
the Constitution.19 
These trends have continued. Just two months after Citizens 
United, the D.C. Circuit extended the logic of the Court’s theory 
that independent expenditures cannot corrupt to invalidate limits 
on contributions to so-called independent expenditure political 
committees.20 That gave birth to “Super PACs,” which can receive 
unlimited contributions and make unlimited independent 
expenditures. Within the next two years, the Court extended 
Citizens United to the states21 and invalidated a key feature of 
voluntary state public financing systems that gave extra funds to 
candidates facing better-financed opponents operating outside 
the system.22 
As for corporate rights claims, the Court has wielded the 
First Amendment to strike down a state law restricting 
commercial sale of physician prescription information,23 and in 
the state and lower federal courts, emboldened corporate 
plaintiffs cite the First Amendment and the Equal Protection 
Clause to challenge laws regarding securities disclosures,24 the 
 
 16. 424 U.S. 1, 15–20 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that limits on political 
contributions and expenditures are restrictions on speech, not conduct). 
 17. See Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (asserting that 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause applies to corporations). 
 18. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 
U.S. 557 (1980) (articulating First Amendment doctrine for protecting “commercial 
speech”); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating 
restriction on corporate expenditures in ballot initiative campaigns). 
 19. See JEFFREY D. CLEMENTS, CORPORATIONS ARE NOT PEOPLE: RECLAIMING 
DEMOCRACY FROM BIG MONEY AND GLOBAL CORPORATIONS 72–79 (2d ed. 2014) 
(summarizing history of development of corporate constitutional rights). 
 20. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 692–95 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) . 
 21. See Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per 
curiam) (extending Citizens United to invalidate state campaign finance law prohibiting 
corporate political expenditures). 
 22. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2829 
(2011) (invalidating state public campaign financing system that provided extra public 
funds to publicly-financed candidates running against privately-financed candidates). 
 23. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011) (invalidating state law 
regulating sale, disclosure, and use of physician prescription information). 
 24. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 370–73 (D.C. Cir. 2014), reh’g 
granted No. 13-5252 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 18, 2014) (considering First Amendment challenge to 
regulation requiring disclosure of whether publicly-traded company’s products contain 
minerals traceable to African conflict). 
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minimum wage,25 food labeling,26 and even a municipal ballot 
measure limiting public financial incentives for nonrenewable 
energy corporations.27 
Even as the November 2014 symposium was being planned, 
the Court issued two more decisions, one each on campaign 
finance and corporate rights, raising many of the same themes. In 
April 2014, the Court decided McCutcheon v. FEC, invalidating 
long-standing restrictions on the total (aggregate) amount that an 
individual could contribute to federal political campaigns.28 Just 
two months later, the Court issued a controversial corporate 
rights decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., allowing a 
religious exercise claim by a corporation whose shareholders 
objected to federal employee health insurance regulations 
regarding coverage for contraceptives.29 It’s safe to say that the 
issues of money in politics, and the intersection of corporations 
and the Constitution, are not going away anytime soon. 
II. THE SYMPOSIUM CONTRIBUTIONS 
The conference that gave rise to this symposium issue 
consisted of four panels: Corporations and the First Amendment; 
Constitutional Dimensions of Corporate Law; Money in Politics 
and Democracy; and Beyond Citizens United and Hobby Lobby. 
These panels brought together scholars from two quite different 
fields of law. As John Coates noted at the outset, for too long 
corporate scholars have ignored constitutional law, and vice versa, 
 
 25. See Int’l Franchise Ass’n v. City of Seattle, No. 2:14-cv-00848 (W.D. Wash. March 
17, 2015) (order denying preliminary injunction) (rejecting First Amendment and Equal 
Protection Clause challenges to minimum wage ordinance), appeal docketed, No. 15-35209 
(9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2015); Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:14-cv-
09603 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 16, 2014) (considering Equal Protection Clause challenge to 
minimum wage ordinance). 
 26. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14−cv−00117, 2015 WL 1931142 (D. Vt. 
Apr. 27, 2015) (granting in part and denying in part motion to dismiss First Amendment 
challenge to law regulating marketing and labeling of food produced with genetically-
engineered ingredients), appeal docketed, No. 15-1504 (2d Cir. May 6, 2015). 
 27. Noel v. Bd. of Elections, No. 1422-CC00249 (Mo. Circuit Ct. May 27, 2014) 
(finding that ballot measure denying public financial incentives to nonrenewable energy 
corporations and their major business partners violates Equal Protection Clause), appeal 
pending sub nom. Jones v. Noel, No. 101630 (Mo. Ct. App. argued May 12, 2015). 
 28. 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014). 
 29. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762−66 (2014). The challenge was raised under both the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
(RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, and was ultimately decided under RFRA. Of course, 
RFRA is “only” a statute. But as a statute, RFRA is unusual—perhaps unique—in its 
relationship to the First Amendment. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760−61 (explaining 
Congressional intent in RFRA as restoring religious liberty protections after change in 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment doctrine). 
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but after Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, these disciplines must 
communicate. That said, the symposium’s goals—and those of this 
issue—have been practical as well as scholarly. As Senator Tester 
noted in his keynote address, it is not sufficient to have the 
conversation: “it must make a difference.”30 
John Coates brings empirical perspective to the rise of 
corporate First Amendment cases. He sets forth parallel histories 
of the corporation and of the First Amendment, noting that the 
Amendment played no role in the country’s dramatic economic 
expansion from the 19th century through the postwar era. Before 
the 1970s, the First Amendment’s role was limited, but mainly 
protected individual expression. But after the Court’s decisions 
protecting “commercial speech” in Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.31 and 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service 
Commission of New York,32 corporate First Amendment litigation 
exploded. In fact, Coates’s empirical analysis of Supreme Court 
and Courts of Appeals decisions indicates that corporations are 
increasingly displacing individuals as the beneficiaries of the First 
Amendment. This recent (but accelerating) trend, he posits, 
presents the “risk of Russia,” as the business sector relies less on 
innovation and efficient addition of value, and more on rent-
seeking through the judicial system. In the end, he warns, this 
“corporate takeover of the First Amendment” is not just bad for 
democracy—it’s also bad for business.33 
Caroline Mala Corbin and Tamara Piety argue that the 
metaphor of corporation as person has led the Court astray. 
Corbin dives into Hobby Lobby’s extension of religious liberty to 
commercial corporations. Surveying the underlying religious and 
secular justifications for protecting religious liberty in the first 
place, she argues that none of them apply to business 
corporations. The nature of the corporate “person,” she argues, 
simply does not make it a suitable vehicle for religious liberty.34 
Piety argues that the personhood framework, and the Court’s 
anti-discrimination rhetoric, is misleading and dangerous because 
 
 30. See Jon Tester, U.S. Sen., Speech at Harvard Law School: Citizens United, 
Democracy, and Ensuring the Rights of Individuals in the Political Process (Nov. 7, 2014) 
(transcript available at http://goo.gl/26gha1). 
 31. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 32. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 33. John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data, 
and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 269 (2015). 
 34. Caroline Mala Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 277 
(2015). 
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it presents business corporations as an embattled minority in need 
of the courts’ counter-majoritarian power. She enumerates and 
rebuts common arguments minimizing the relevance of corporate 
personhood in constitutional analysis, and argues that avoiding 
this issue obscures important value judgments.35 
Kent Greenfield and Tom Joo counter that the problem with 
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby does not lie in corporate 
personhood. In Joo’s view, personhood is a red herring; the root 
of the problem is not attribution of First Amendment rights to 
corporations, but rather the Court’s analysis of corporate political 
spending. He argues that the Court’s naïve trust in “corporate 
democracy”36 belies corporate law realities, including board-
centric governance, limited shareholder powers, and the 
undemocratic nature of shareholder voting. He posits that 
constitutional analysis should consider the structure of corporate 
governance, and the fundamental incompatibility of corporate 
governance with democratic governance justifies limiting 
corporate involvement in politics.37 Greenfield, in contrast, 
maintains that the ultimate solution lies in fundamentally 
restructuring corporate law. He proposes reforming corporate 
governance, by extending management’s fiduciary obligations to 
include employees and other corporate stakeholders and by 
mandating employee representation on boards, to make the 
corporate “person” behave more like a real person.38 
Jed Purdy and Larry Tribe argue that, to think clearly about 
moving past Citizens United on the role of money in politics, we 
need a better conception of democratic values and civic 
engagement. In Purdy’s view, our notion of citizenship is mired in 
an economistic, anti-civic culture, and campaign finance reform 
must be part of a larger program of revitalizing democratic 
culture. Unless we can rejuvenate an egalitarian democratic 
conception, distinct from the self-interested marketplace, he 
fears, we will lose a democracy worthy of the name.39 Tribe takes 
a different path to a compatible conclusion. He emphasizes that 
we must speak precisely about the nature of the Court’s error in 
Citizens United: not the narrow judgment in that particular case 
 
 35. Tamara R. Piety, Why Personhood Matters, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 361 (2015). 
 36. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362, 370 (2010). 
 37. Thomas W. Joo, Corporate Speech and the Rights of Others, 30 CONST. 
COMMENT. 335 (2015). 
 38. Kent Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate Persons, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 309 
(2015). 
 39. Jedediah Purdy, That We Are Underlings: The Real Problems in Disciplining 
Political Spending and the First Amendment, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 391 (2015). 
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(involving a nonprofit that sought to distribute a movie), but 
rather the Court’s fundamental conception of First Amendment 
values. He argues that, while the First Amendment embraces the 
libertarian values proclaimed by the Court, it also embraces 
egalitarian and democratic values that the Court ignored. In his 
view, campaign finance should be reconstructed with some 
judicial humility: recognizing empirical realities and competing 
constitutional values, granting the political branches some space 
to limit the conversion of economic inequality to political 
inequality, and taking a modest approach rather than going “all 
in” on a particular ideological conception of democracy.40 
Jennifer Taub and Ciara Torres-Spelliscy discuss practical 
solutions to problems created by Citizens United and Hobby 
Lobby that are motivated by the language of the decisions 
themselves. Torres-Spelliscy examines Citizens United’s concept 
of “corporate democracy” from the perspective of “say on pay” 
and “say on politics” proposals. She traces the evolution of 
shareholder voting on executive compensation, and observes that 
management resisted “say on pay” with a laundry list of legal and 
policy objections that ultimately suggest a discomfort with 
corporate democracy within the executive suite and boardroom. 
She observes a similar trajectory at the early stages of proposals 
to require shareholder approval of corporate political spending, 
and argues that, despite management objections, the law supports 
giving shareholders a “say on politics.”41 Taub examines Hobby 
Lobby’s focus on “closely-held” corporations as the purest 
embodiment of its model of corporation-as-association. She 
suggests that the post-Hobby Lobby effort to define the subset of 
corporations that meet the Court’s vision—to develop a “Hobby 
Lobby Tool”—could be broadly productive. If corporate exercise 
of religion can be limited to a tight subset of corporations, based 
on structural features of the corporation, then perhaps those same 
principles could limit the Court’s expansion of corporate 
constitutional rights in other domains, such as political spending.42 
III. CONCLUSION 
Citizens United has led to great concern about the direction 
 
 40. Laurence H. Tribe, Dividing Citizens United: The Case v. the Controversy, 30 
CONST. COMMENT. 463 (2015). 
 41. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Democracy from Say on Pay to Say on Politics, 
30 CONST. COMMENT. 431 (2015). 
 42. Jennifer S. Taub, Is Hobby Lobby a Tool for Limiting Corporate Constitutional 
Rights?, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 403 (2015). 
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of our democracy. But as the symposium itself and the thoughtful 
contributions to this issue show, there is reason for hope. Thirty-
five years ago, Justice Rehnquist wrote in dissent that “in a 
democracy, the economic is subordinate to the political, a lesson 
that our ancestors learned long ago, and that our descendants will 
undoubtedly have to relearn many years hence.”43 We are now 
relearning that lesson, and there is light ahead. 
 
 43. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 
557, 599 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
